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Abstract 
As developing countries increasingly integrate themselves into the global economy, increased 
social spending is desirable to protect their vulnerable groups from rapid changes experienced by 
the economy associated with increased openness. However, while developed nations are largely 
successful in maintaining and increasing their social spending as a response to globalization, the 
case with developing countries is usually the opposite. We find that key determinants of this 
divergence between developing and developed countries stems from factors such as the extent of 
surplus and informal labor, quality of democracy and democratic institutions, and the power of 
unions. As India further integrates into the global economy, it can maintain its social spending by 
expanding its employment guarantee programs such as NREGA, and work to bridge the gap 
between formal and informal workers. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis studies the impact of globalization on social spending in developing and developed 
countries and identifies how this impact differs across countries. In doing so, it delves into the 
reasons behind this difference in impact, and then applies them to the context of India. The aim 
is to provide lessons for India to maintain and increase its social spending as it continues to 
experience globalization as well as to define specific and actionable recommendations which are 
deeply informed by the Indian context. 
1.2 Motivation 
Global trade in the Post-War era has largely been concentrated in the Global North, however, 
over the past several decades, developing countries have been increasingly integrating 
themselves into the world economy. Developing countries have become major trade partners 
with not only developed countries but also other developing countries. Besides promoting 
export-oriented industrialization, many low developed countries (LDCs) actively attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in an attempt to gain from globalization.  
Such gains from globalization are strongly emphasized, particularly by international 
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Promoting 
neoliberal policies of trade liberalization, openness to foreign capital, and domestic deregulation, 
these organizations claim that international openness would enable LDCs to gain access to new 
technologies and skills as transnational corporations (TNCs) establish operations in the host 
countries, bringing capital, creating employment, and increasing output. Many neoliberal policy 
packages comprising such globalization and liberalization measures, labeled as structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs), have been prescribed to LDCs in economic trouble as a condition 
for international assistance and funding.  
However, globalization is a time of rapid change for increasingly integrated LDCs. The adoption 
of neoliberal policies has been found to create some level of harm on the economies and people 
of LDCs. Interlinking their supply chains with those of developed countries often allows 
recessions and fluctuations in the business cycle experienced by industrialized countries to be 
transmitted to developing countries. Moreover, structural adjustment policies often carried out in 
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LDCs to attract FDI have made the position of many vulnerable segments of the population, such 
as the poor, illiterate, and the elderly, even more insecure. As these countries grow and become 
an increasingly integrated part of the global economy, rapid urbanization, ageing populations, 
and other social changes have weakened the traditional safety net provided by family and 
community, necessitating formal social security measures.  
Globalization will persist, and there is no point in making blanket statements such as 
‘globalization is good’ or ‘globalization is bad’. Rather, we must strategically guide globalization 
to ensure that it delivers the maximum amount of good while creating reinforcements for the 
negative consequences. As globalization may create greater insecurity for vulnerable groups, 
there is a need to provide safety nets, especially as traditional community-provided safety nets 
wither. Unfortunately, however, LDCs often have a weaker social net than do industrialized 
nations, and some evidence points to the fact that the social welfare and social security 
institutions of LDCs may not be able to handle the pressures of fiscal contraction posed by 
capital mobility and international openness, leaving vulnerable groups to fend for themselves. 
This may result in disastrous consequences for equity, poverty, and social stability.  
A major emerging market, India faces all these challenges. With a high population growth, India 
is expected to be the world’s most populous country within the next decade. Having begun token 
liberalization measures from the 1980s, and full-scale measures from the 1990s, India has had 
mixed success in protecting the economic wellbeing of its marginalized groups, and it is 
imperative to explain what aspects may be contributing positively or negatively to the changes in 
social spending. With over 73 million Indians living in poverty as of 2018, and many more in 
vulnerable conditions, how globalization affects social spending in India will have a profound 
impact on the standard of living, the quality of life, and economic security of a population greater 
than that of the entire United Kingdom.  
Therefore, the aim of this research is to identify the causes behind the contraction of social 
security and welfare spending in LDCs and industrialized countries as a result of globalization. 
In doing so, it will highlight important political, economic, and institutional barriers to expanding 
protection for the vulnerable, and will identify lessons and develop recommendations for India to 
ensure that its vulnerable groups are well-protected and able to contribute in an increasingly open 
economy, and that India benefits from integrating itself into the global economy. This thesis is 
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organized as follows. Chapter 2 is an overview of the literature related to the issues examined in 
this thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the rise of globalization in the developing world. Chapter 4 
examines globalization and its effects on social spending in both developing and developed 
countries. Chapter 5 presents the lessons for India following an overview of the Indian context 
and Chapter 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
This literature review is organized as follows. Firstly, the term ‘social security’ will be defined 
for the purposes of this paper and then this study will briefly consider the increasing level of 
integration of LDCs in the global economy, and the processes leading up to it. While the 
definition of the term globalization itself is up for debate, we can understand globalization in 
terms of international trade and capital mobility. Given the changes globalization has led to in 
many LDCs, this study argues that there is a need for increased social security and welfare 
spending by LDC governments to protect their vulnerable populations. Secondly, this study 
considers the level and type of social security and welfare spending that currently exists in LDCs 
and what social programs are particularly desirable in the context of the challenges and 
limitations faced by LDCs. Evidence brings to light declining social spending in LDCs as a result 
of globalization, and then this argument will be considered by appreciating the autonomy LDCs 
have in terms of determining their spending levels despite globalization pressures. This 
discussion involves the consideration of the internal economic, political, and social 
characteristics of a country which could result in an adverse effect on welfare due to 
globalization. Thirdly, these findings will be applied to the case of India and recommendations 
will be made for India to follow which will allow the country to protect its social spending for 
the benefit of its marginalized populations.  
Literature involving social security and welfare does not completely agree on precise definitions 
of the two topics, and often studies them together under the guise of terms such as “social 
spending”. There is no widespread agreement regarding what constitutes social security spending 
and what constitutes social welfare spending; both types of spending are often considered 
together. For the purposes of this study, the definition of social security used by Van Ginneken 
(2003, p. 279) is found to be useful: “benefits that society provides to individuals and households 
– through public and collective measures – to guarantee them a minimum standard of living and 
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to protect them against low or declining living standards arising out of a number of basic risks 
and needs.” Such spending covers both social insurance, a form of protection funded by 
compulsory contributions such as unemployment benefits, as well as tax-financed benefits, 
which are benefits paid out of tax revenues, such as a public food distribution scheme. This 
definition may go well beyond the definition of social security used by many other scholars as it 
is meant to account for all forms of public assistance to vulnerable groups. In the United States, 
for example, social security has a more restricted definition as the Social Security program refers 
to social insurance schemes only.  
There is much literature about the increasing extent of integration of LDCs into the global 
economy. Marelli and Signorelli (2011) highlight the gradualist nature of the Chinese and Indian 
integration experiences which have to date resulted in markets with lower trade barriers and 
greater openness to foreign direct investment (FDI). Panagariya (2001) brings out the changes 
that have taken place in India; tariffs which once ranged from 110%-150% for most goods have 
come down heavily, and import licensing, which divided goods into four categories subject to 
varying restrictions, have been completely abolished. Considering LDCs as a whole, it can be 
seen that their share of global trade has gone up from less than 30% to nearly 45% from the years 
2000 to 2015. 
Khan (1997) points out the impetus for integration for many LDCs was the need for adjustment 
following imbalances to their balance of payments as a result of the 1970s oil crisis and the 
ensuing recession in industrialized countries which reduced demand for exports from LDCs. As a 
result, many LDCs began to experience economic trouble, especially problems with their balance 
of payments. Approaching international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF for 
assistance, these countries had to accept to undergo SAPs as conditions for loans. SAPs included 
liberalization and globalization mandates, such as the reduction of tariffs and quotas, fiscal 
responsibility, and increased capital mobility. Khan further highlights the often adverse 
outcomes to growth, inequality, and poverty alleviation as a result of implementing policies 
towards openness. Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and many Sub-Saharan nations are among the 
countries which have experienced such adverse effects; the East Asian nations were rare cases 
which did not experience a rise in poverty or inequality due to globalization. Khan blames the 
level of surplus labor and the consequent low output elasticity of employment and cutbacks in 
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social spending as key reasons many LDCs face adverse outcomes, creating a justification for 
extensive protection to vulnerable groups through social security and welfare.  
The type and extent of social security and welfare spending in LDCs will now be considered. 
While social security and welfare are generally considered the domain of industrialized nations, 
LDCs too have a duty to protect their most vulnerable individuals and groups from the vagaries 
of the market. However, due to a large proportion of workers employed in the informal economy, 
Van Ginneken (2003) argues that the ideal policies for LDCs often differ from the ideal policies 
of middle-income and industrialized countries. For example, unemployment insurance is not 
necessarily applicable to LDCs as the informal sector accounts for much of the employment in 
LDCs, creating informational barriers inhibiting the distribution of benefits and collection of 
taxes. Ahmad (1991) argues that important safety net measures for LDCs include employment 
guarantee schemes and pension schemes; the latter are easier to launch when the elderly 
comprise only a small portion of the population. Despite these possibilities, social security in 
LDCs like China and India is patchy and excludes the majority of the needy.  
Scholars have expressed concerns that the competitive pressures of the international marketplace 
with its neoliberal leanings force integrating LDCs to compete with other countries to attract 
capital and encourage trade; these scholars conclude that welfare states in LDCs would tend to 
converge in their features through a race to the bottom in social spending, taxes, and labor 
standards. However, other scholars find this to be a simplistic argument and believe that internal 
economic, political, and social circumstances play a greater role in shaping social spending. The 
next section, therefore, is devoted to understanding how social spending in different LDCs 
responds to globalization pressures and what internal factors drive responses in particular 
directions. When considering the kind of welfare state established in many LDCs, Rudra (2007) 
finds three main types; productive welfare states, states which promote market development and 
the commodification of labor; protective welfare states, which are focused on protecting their 
citizens from the market; and dual-states, which have features of both. These findings provide 
evidence against convergence tendencies in LDCs. Ramesh (2004) takes this topic further and 
argues that the impact of globalization on welfare spending is varied, taking the example of East 
Asian countries, and that countries have agency over their response regarding welfare spending 
as a result of globalization.  
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These conclusions have been complemented by the work of Swank (1998), which found that 
there is no evidence to back up the hypothesis that business taxes have fallen in response to 
increasing capital mobility in advanced market economies. Rather, as Swank points out, business 
taxation has become subject to new market conforming rules which have been developed 
alongside increasing globalization. These findings go against the long-held conventional view 
that in the face of globalization, countries become less able to provide services and social 
democratic organizations and entities become worse off. According to Swank’s work, market-
conforming rules have involved maintaining the revenue generation roles of tax while reducing 
the economic management roles of the tax, for example, cuts in corporate profits tax have been 
accompanied by base-broadening in the form of elimination of investment reliefs.  
Ramesh (2004) cites a study by Rudra (2002) which found that public spending on social welfare 
in 53 LDCs declined from 3.2% of GDP in early 1970s to 2.5% in the mid-1990s while during 
the same period, spending on social welfare rose from 12% to 16% in OECD countries. This 
study by Rudra (2002) considers the divergent outcomes between developing and developed 
countries in terms of changes in their extent of welfare spending as a response to globalization, 
and points to the importance of labor as a possible answer. Previous studies have considered 
various possible causes, such as the elderly comprising a greater proportion of the total 
population in industrialized nations compared to in developing countries; the elderly and similar 
situated interest groups are welfare beneficiaries and can successfully pressurize the government 
to protect welfare spending. However, labor is the primary interest group in LDCs and its lack of 
influence is unexplained by these hypotheses. Therefore, Rudra considers the case of labor and 
finds that the abundance of low-skilled and surplus labor creates collective action problems for 
labor, condemning them to a weak bargaining position. Rudra argues that unionization rates in 
developing countries are a poor indicator of labor strength as unions are often suppressed in 
many countries; she creates an index called Potential Labor Power (PLP), which considers the 
ratio of skilled to unskilled workers and the proportion of surplus labor in the total labor force. 
Rudra finds that variations in PLP can help explain the divergence in welfare and social security 
spending in LDCs compared to industrialized nations as a result of globalization.  
Manning (1998) contributes to this discussion regarding the weak position of workers in LDCs. 
Poor worker education and awareness levels contribute to generating a weak bargaining position 
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which workers cannot overcome; the extent of surplus labor makes bargaining less attractive as 
surplus laborers are most worried about securing a job with pay, without much consideration to 
benefits, at least in the early stages. This also explains the lack of social insurance offered to 
such employees. Also, unionization has not resulted in many rights for workers as disputes are 
often settled in favour of the employers in much of East Asia; Manning regards Taiwan and 
Korea as notable exceptions and argues that worker awareness and education, as in these two 
countries, can secure worker rights. Besides Taiwan and Korea, Indonesia, also a democracy, 
experienced significant improvements to labor protection after embarking on export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI) growth as the initial poor conditions sparked concern and industrial 
unrest. On the whole, while autocratic governments are responsible for poor labor standards by 
denying labor rights and suppressing wages and the presence of democratic institutions helps 
preserve rights and higher labor standards, the willingness of the large number of surplus 
workers to work in such conditions has been a far more important contributing factor.  
Ramesh claims that while the case of PLP can be verified to the extent it is corroborated by the 
cases of Hong Kong, Thailand, and Taiwan where negligible unemployment throughout the 
1980s and 1990s coincided with an increase in welfare, there is no evidence available that labor 
was the key cause for the increase in welfare spending, except for in Korea; while Malaysia and 
Singapore experienced labor shortages, they did not benefit from an increase in welfare 
spending. Ramesh insists that scholars consider more deeply the various domestic and 
international factors at play. For example, recent works have begun to appreciate the importance 
of the political-economic institutional underpinnings of various countries, such as social-
democratic or conservative. Furthermore, Ramesh points to the condition of democracy as an 
important indicator of the impact on welfare spending as a result of globalization; according to 
Ramesh, democratization in Korea and Taiwan since the 1980s has been an important driver to 
welfare spending expansion. A key complement to the rise in democratization is the rise in civil 
society, which tends to speak out for marginalized groups, including groups marginalized by 
globalization.  
Rudra and Haggard (2005) considered further the impact of democracy or lack thereof on social 
spending in an environment of increasing international economic integration and openness using 
a sample of 57 LDCs. They provide a theoretical justification for democracies better preserving 
12 | P a g e  
 
their social spending than other kinds of regimes; democracy involves competition between 
political parties which pushes policy towards the interest of the median voter, who is likely to 
benefit from some kind of welfare or social security spending. Their findings show that while 
democracies may not necessarily enjoy higher levels of social spending, they are more attentive 
to protecting their citizens’ basic needs than authoritarian regimes in a time of increasing 
openness. Based on the results, countries were divided into three buckets: democracies, soft 
authoritarian regimes, and hard authoritarian regimes. In non-democracies, trade openness was 
found to have an adverse effect on social spending. In democracies, trade openness was found to 
have no effect; electoral competition and the presence of interest groups makes democracies 
more accountable to the interests of the poor and the elderly. Swank (1998) too found that 
business taxation was more affected by the size of the aged population, as well as the level of 
unemployment.  
The idea that democracies must protect their citizens from the potential threats posed by 
globalization has major implications, as found by Rieger and Leibfried (1998). Their work 
argues that the stronger the pressures posed by globalization and the more open the economy, the 
more difficult it becomes for governments to adversely modify social spending. If governments 
respond to globalization by cutting social spending, special interest groups who view 
protectionism as the best alternative would organize to resist globalization. To maintain 
globalization, therefore, governments must ensure that losers from globalization are being duly 
compensated. Certain inherent criticisms of globalization make the maintenance of welfare 
spending desirable: the temporal precedence of losses to losers compared to gains to winners; the 
risk of a nation’s welfare becoming politically dependent on external conditions which are 
outside the nation’s control; and the risk to advanced nations emanating from wage competition 
with LDCs.  
In democratic societies, welfare spending levels have earned a degree of primacy as state activity 
and social rights expanded throughout the twentieth century. The transformation of industrial 
societies into welfare states helped guarantee their international openness and helped make 
possible a much greater level of international division of labor. This is because the more one’s 
subsistence depends on the market and the more the market itself is determined by external 
circumstances, people find protectionism a legitimate option; in the presence of a strong safety 
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net, however, protectionism is superfluous. With a safety net to fall back on, people become less 
risk-averse in taking advantages of the opportunities presented by the market. The authors 
provide evidence by looking at the cases of the United States and West Europe; the United States 
is relatively less integrated into the global economy and therefore experiences a much broader 
capacity for change, as demonstrated by the radical change in the US welfare policy in 1996 
which ended the right to welfare and posed restrictions on benefits. On the other hand, Western 
Europe comprises countries much more intensely internationally integrated; this high level of 
external pressure nearly prohibits major changes in the status quo of their social welfare 
spending policies. Meanwhile, Taiwan and Korea experienced leaps in their welfare spending 
alongside their major increases in international integration.  
Rodrik (1998) also carried out a study along similar lines. A previous study by Cameron (1978) 
concluded that open economies have higher rates of industrial concentration, fostering 
unionization, more opportunities for collective bargaining, and ultimately, greater labor power. 
However, the study was carried out for only 18 OECD countries and labor institutions are not 
very relevant to LDCs. Yet, Rodrik’s work found a positive correlation between exposure to 
trade and size of government spending in high-income as well as low-income countries. This 
highlighted the risk-reducing role governments must play as the price for its citizens to accept a 
higher level of risk. Rodrik considered general government spending as any specific types of 
spending may be applicable to only LDCs or only industrialized societies; a safety net involving 
social insurance is largely applicable only to developed countries due to the lack of 
administrative capacity faced by LDCs. To serve the same purpose of risk reduction, LDCs 
engage in programs such as public employment, in-kind transfers, and public works 
programmes.  
Despite these findings, we can see numerous instances across the spectrum of LDCs where there 
has been, in some period, some adverse effect on social spending as a result of globalization. 
Considering the above-mentioned characteristics and features of countries which determine the 
direction and magnitude of the effect on social spending as a result of globalization, this study 
will now bring out the salient factors of the Indian context, and tie in together the literature 
consulted to devise meaningful recommendations for India which would allow the country to 
protect its vulnerable segments from the vagaries of the international market. Therefore, the 
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circumstances surrounding labor power, democracy, and civil society in India are now 
considered.  
While unionization rates and circumstances may not be useful guides to estimate the labor power 
in many LDCs due to the lack of democracy and the suppression of unions and worker rights, 
this is not necessarily true to the case of India. As the world’s largest democracy, India is a truly 
pluralistic society with unions affiliated to political parties across the political spectrum and 
representing workers by engaging in collective bargaining. D’Souza (2008) claims that activism 
by unions has helped create overly protective labor regulation, which through amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), has been applicable to even smaller firms. Of course, the picture 
is not entirely rosy, and analyzing the state of unionization and collective bargaining in India is 
an important step to understanding labor power. Hensman (2010) points out that there is 
significant legislation to protect formal workers but the majority of the workforce in India 
comprises informal labor, which does not enjoy labor protection and whose presence also 
weakens labor rights for all. Labor protection legislation deliberately excludes informal workers, 
and employers can creatively treat their workers such that they fall under the category of 
informal workers, thus denying them protection. Such assault on labor rights began well before 
globalization and liberalization measures and intensified under the right-wing National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition governments over time. Hensman concludes that the key 
reason behind an assault in labor rights has been the presence of informal labor, and any 
suspensions to this decline in labor rights, including the founding of the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA), which guarantees poor rural households 100 days of 
work per year, has been the result of activism by left-leaning parties and entities.  
Besides specific labor rights, it is important to consider the impact on marginalized communities 
in general. As in other LDCs, a key form of social protection in India comes in the form of 
public employment, especially secure rural employment. A study by Ganguly-Scrase and Scrase 
(2001) considers the impact of globalization on low-income workers in the Indian state of West 
Bengal and finds that globalization has been accompanied by contractions in secure rural 
employment, thus hitting hard those groups which already suffer from a general degree of 
marginalization and an inability to participate in lucrative international markets. Therefore, the 
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structural adjustment programs imposed on India which called for a decline in public expenditure 
have indeed materialized in reduced social spending.  
However, any further marginalization of the losers from globalization could be countered by an 
active civil society. Sahoo (2008) traces the development of civil society in India and claims that 
in the early days after Independence in 1947, civil society was largely the domain of the English-
educated elite; a strong welfare state where the state assumed the role of provider, protector, and 
regulator of social welfare made for a depoliticised citizenry. However, as this role of the state 
reduced following liberalization and globalization in the 1980s onwards, civil society developed 
a new voice and started taking up causes previously left to the state. The number of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) grew significantly, and so did government spending on civil 
society, while many grassroots movements emerged. This mushrooming of India’s civil society 
can be credited to its robust democratic apparatus which has allowed pluralistic non-government 
organizations to take up roles which are no longer the priorities of the government.  
The literature suggests a variety of solutions which are further developed in this study. On a 
general note concerning LDCs, Ahmad (1991) points out that LDC social spending should be 
based on what households do to protect themselves and fill the gaps produced by the withering of 
traditional family security and the inherent risk pooling problems associated with community-
based welfare, which refers to a decentralized system of social spending where the lowest levels 
of governance play an active role in the provision of social services. For example, village heads 
may identify and disburse welfare to the needy. Ahmad advocates for the use of employment 
guarantee schemes, which in India’s case could be an expansion of the NREGA and similar 
schemes taking into account regional variables; Gunter and van der Hoeven (2004) echo the 
importance of employment programmes. Ahmad also advocates the development of a pension 
scheme when the proportion of the elderly is low, as initially contributions would exceed 
payoffs, ensuring the scheme starts off on a strong standing; this is applicable in India’s case due 
to the large proportion of youth in the population. Ramachandran’s (2010) analysis indicates the 
benefit of social democratic institutions in the country’s political and economic landscape to 
protect welfare spending. Therefore, the Indian left must band together in order to protect social 
spending, be it the Left political parties, or trade unions. It was insistence by the Left which 
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helped the NREGA to pass through and be implemented; such successes need to be repeated by 
further organization and lobbying.  
While democracy is important and India has a robust democratic foundation as evidenced by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global Democracy Index (2018) and Freedom House (2018) 
annual reports on India, democracy itself will not protect social spending without strong electoral 
competition across the political spectrum. This calls for parties to represent the marginalized 
groups and have their voice heard; only with strong competition will policy decision-making 
tend towards the interests of the median voter. Meanwhile, the role of civil society is important 
to counterbalance potential government failings and to protect certain groups who may not 
represent a significant vote-bank. Besides the government and civil society, the community is 
another vital institution which can extend programs at the local level. Integrating people into 
employment programs can be time-consuming, and even when implemented, many people may 
be left out for a variety of reasons. To practically ensure that all can benefit from social 
spending, the government can aid the growth of community-level programs which also reach 
informal workers, as Van Ginneken points out. However, many marginalized have no link to the 
labor market so tax-financed benefits will always remain important for many groups; 
community-level programmes can help in local identification of those unable to work and the 
indigent. Meanwhile, Indian democracy is by no means perfect and Hensman (2010) calls for a 
redirection of funding from the military to social welfare to further strengthen democracy.  
The effective implementation of employment programs can work to reduce the size of the 
informal economy and empower workers to seek appropriate formal-sector jobs. This will extend 
protection to a greater proportion of workers, and based on Rudra’s Potential Labor Power 
model, work to improve the collective bargaining power of all workers. Meanwhile, more robust 
and effective social democratic institutions can help bring genuine legislative and regulatory 
gains to workers and marginalized groups. With labor having greater awareness of their rights, 
these together can translate into expanded and more secure social spending, as experienced by 
democratic East Asian economies such as Korea and Taiwan.  
Beyond recommendations for India, scholars point to a need for international coordination. In an 
environment of capital mobility, regulations and standards, including labor standards, in one 
country create impacts to such standards elsewhere. Therefore, India can stand to benefit if other 
17 | P a g e  
 
LDCs take stock of their standards and regulations too. Khor (2001) argues for the need of 
South-to-South coordination. Hensman (2010) calls for coordination among unions on an 
international level to secure benefits for workers across borders in tandem. He argues that unions 
worldwide must pressure their governments to incorporate a clause in World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreements empowering the International Labor Organization (ILO) and to help 
countries improve labor rights and penalize those which do not do so. Work by Lee (2002) and 
Arifianto (2004), in relation to Malaysia and Indonesia respectively, highlight the merit of entire 
social security schemes targeted to informal workers. These are generic recommendations which 
must be taken in the context of the Indian scenario to create sound policy. 
We then consider the unique context and characteristics of India in order to use the general 
recommendations provided by literature to provide specific suggestions for the case of India. 
Basole and Basu (2011) help us understand the rigid segmentation of workers in India between 
the formal and informal sectors and the wide discrepancies in the labor rights and conditions 
enjoyed by the two groups. How and why exactly these differences emerged is qualified by work 
by Dibyendu, Saha, and Sen (2013), which provides insight into the very protective labor 
legislation in India which applies to the formal sector. However, corporations have managed to 
creatively exploit loopholes such that the majority of the workforce finds itself in the informal 
sector or as casual workers in the formal sector, who do not enjoy the fruits of unionization or 
benefit from the protective labor legislation. 
Work by Krishnamurty (2008), and Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) provide insight into the 
situation of surplus labor in India. They point to the low mechanization and small-scale nature of 
farming in India, which results in too many people cultivating too little land. These problems are 
compounded by the lack of non-agricultural employment opportunities in rural areas and the 
seasonality of agriculture, making even the dominant economic activity precarious for many. 
Poor bargaining power for the entire workforce can be partly explained by these surplus workers 
who provide an almost unlimited supply of labor in urban areas upon migration and do not pay 
attention to the conditions and terms of employment as their primary concern is just to find work. 
Saboo’s (2008) work provides insight into India’s civil society framework, which is robust as 
expected from a pluralistic democracy. However, civil society has not had paid much attention 
and consequently had little success in fighting for the rights of informal and casual workers. 
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We have previously mentioned employment guarantee and generation schemes; this is 
particularly notable in India’s case, as India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA) guarantees 100 days of paid employment to every rural household in the country and 
is the largest employment guarantee program in the world. Using the works of Ghose (2011) and 
Azam (2012), we trace the beginnings of this pilot scheme, launched by law passed in 2005. 
These works help us understand that the nature of work involves work typically associated with 
such projects, such as construction and irrigation, and points to the strengths and limitations of 
the scheme. The scheme has raised wages of the rural poor, however, there are logistical 
challenges which are yet to be taken care of and corruption in the form of leakages has 
undermined the total benefit that can be provided. On the whole, however, this scheme has 
directed government efforts in the right direction to mitigate the effects o surplus labor and allow 
for rural development. 
These works form the foundation upon which we draft recommendations for India, which also 
involves studying other works. Rengasamy and Sasi Kumar (2011) help us explore 
recommendations within the realm of the NREGA scheme. They identify that performance 
metrics such as the average number of days of employment offered vary significantly by state 
and urge a deeper analysis of the characteristics of particular states which affect performance. 
This work also helps us understand the need for sophisticated information technology 
infrastructure which stores and processes data to aid us in our understanding of the predictors of 
performance of the program. This finding applies to not only NREGA but also all other social 
welfare schemes. Dutta (2015) explores the state-by-state study of NREGA’s performance 
further by considering two particular states and understanding the reasons for their varied 
performance under the NREGA. Key indicators are political commitment of governments to the 
program and the level of accountability of public officials towards citizens. Dutta also urges 
increases in participation of females and other marginalized groups to  improve overall program 
effectiveness and accountability. 
Advances in information technology have another role to play. According to work by Bertot, 
Jaeger, and Grimes (2010), India must empower beneficiaries of NREGA and other social 
schemes through the timely and accurate provision of information regarding the antecedents of 
the program and the beneficiaries’ rights. E-government and social media can be effectively 
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leveraged to provide information and effective redressal mechanisms. The other side of the 
equation, however, is the provision of digital literacy training so people can actually use these 
mediums, which can provide transparency into the functioning of the programs. Beyond digital 
skills, we must recognize that a key differentiator between an informal employee and a formal 
employee is the employee’s skillset and how relevant those skills are in the current economic 
context. Unni and Rani (2003) point out the need to provide training and education to the 
marginalized, which can be accomplished through non-government organizations. Here, the local 
context must be respected; as many cannot afford the lost income associated with pursuing 
formal education, the dispersion of skills within families is a crucial means of training in India. 
Unni and Rani assert that these mediums of learning must be supported and complemented by 
government programs and actions by non-government organizations. 
The review of the literature on this subject, therefore, provides background material allowing us 
to understand the situation regarding social welfare in LDCs, appreciate the unique 
circumstances India faces, and provide policy recommendations suitable for the Indian context. 
3. The Rise of Globalization in the Developing World 
While trade and capital flows have traditionally been restricted to industrialized nations, 
developing countries have increasingly been catching up and becoming active in the global 
economy. Activity between developing countries and developed countries has increased, as well 
as activity between developing countries. Data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) show 
that developing countries share of total international trade in goods increased by less than 30% in 
the year 2000 to over 40% in the year 2015 (WTO, 2016). Meanwhile, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows into developing countries have increased by a factor of 20 from 1990 to 2017. The 
rise of globalization has occurred on the lines of neoliberalism, spurred by the fall of the Bretton 
Woods system, the fall of Communism, and improvements in transportation and communication 
technologies (Achanso, 2014). However, we seek to understand the driving force behind the rise 
of international integration among developing countries. 
Developing countries have been integrating into the world economy since the 1980s and much of 
the impetus towards globalization in the developing world has resulted from the need to adjust 
balance of payments imbalances experienced in the aftermath of the oil crisis in the 1970s. 
During this period, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) instituted a 
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planned decline in the quantity of oil produced in an effort to increase its push and raise the oil 
exporters’ revenue. The resulting price increases created significant inflation and stagflation 
throughout the world, and in an attempt to cure the persistently high inflation, interest rates were 
raised significantly, which brought about an ensuing recession lasting into the 1980s. The 1970s 
were a time when many developing countries had taken loans from developed countries’ banks 
and governments and the higher interest rates, coupled with the lower demand for exports to the 
same countries due to the recession, created major balance of payments imbalances and brought 
about difficulties in repaying the loans. Approaching international organizations such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for assistance, the countries were subjected to 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which included a package of neoliberal policies 
collectively known as the Washington Consensus. These policies included liberalization and 
openness to international capital, as well as reductions in tariffs and other barriers to trade. As a 
result, many developing countries seeking assistance regarding their loans opened up to the 
global economy (Khan, 1997).  
Yet, the argument that SAPs were ‘imposed’ on passive developing countries lacks nuance. In 
many countries, the demand for globalization and liberalization came from within, as was the 
case for India (Hensman, 2010). Home to a genuine bourgeoisie class, many Indians demanded 
opening up the economy, and such pressures came not only from international organizations but 
also from domestic politics (Ganguly-Scrase & Scrase, 2001). Liberalization and globalization 
processes and techniques varied across countries, in terms of their pace, scope, and extent. China 
and India, two countries in the international limelight, for example, were much more gradual in 
their transformations than member countries of the former Warsaw Pact (Marelli & Signorelli, 
2011).  
In China, reform began in 1978 from an inefficient state-run economy to an increasingly market-
oriented one. Reform was deliberate and proceeded sequentially sector-by-sector. The 1970s and 
early 1980s witnessed agricultural reform, including changes to the collective system and the 
distribution of the excess production beyond the planned volume to households. Industrial 
reform came next, including profits and wages liberalization. Finally, China experienced greater 
openness to FDI, international trade, and China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001. Reform in India, though gradual as in China compared to the former Communist countries, 
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progressed in a very different manner; for one, reform in India began later and was never as 
intense as in China (Marelli & Signorelli, 2011). The Indian reform began in the 1980s and was 
piecemeal and incremental to begin with; it was of a more consequential nature as a response to 
the imminent balance of payments crisis in 1991. Like many other developing countries, India 
increased its external debt burden to the point that financing the burden became unsustainable; its 
foreign debt in 1990 was around US$64.4 billion, over three times the value of the foreign debt 
just ten years earlier. This foreign debt then crept into current account deficits, fueling a balance 
of payments crisis. Prior to reforms, India’s heavy industry was a state monopoly and pervasive 
licensing stifled private activity in other industries. Tariffs were high; most ranged from 110% to 
150%, peaking at around 400% for certain goods. However, today tariffs are much lower, and 
import licensing, once applicable to most goods, has been completely done away (Panagariya, 
2001).  
In today’s neoliberal order, globalization has many proponents, who speak to the benefits of 
increased output and variety of goods, transfers in skills and technology, and increased 
productive efficiency, ultimately leading to higher incomes. However, there are also studies 
which find that globalization may exacerbate the differences in outcomes between winners and 
losers of a capitalist system by hindering efforts to compensate those worse off. Among other 
mandates, SAPs call for greater fiscal discipline by reducing public expenditure on social 
security, including public employment (Van Ginneken, 2003), as well as in agricultural subsidies 
which are crucial public measures in developing countries, where agriculture still employs a 
significant proportion of the labor force (Achanso, 2014). In South Asia, efforts to alleviate 
poverty have been greatly interrupted as a result of increased openness, resulting in a decline in 
the rate of poverty alleviation, or as in Bangladesh’s case, an absolute increase in the proportion 
of the population living under poverty. Entire nations, as in Sub-Saharan Africa, have been 
marginalized by globalization, left behind suffering negative growth (Khan, 1997). Meanwhile, 
while globalization is per the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem expected to benefit the most abundant 
factor, this being unskilled labor in developing countries, and thus reducing poverty and 
inequality, empirical evidence suggests that the opposite has occurred in many developing 
countries (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). This has much to do with the fact that the poor and 
unskilled communities depend significantly on government spending in the form of benefits, 
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transfers, employment, and rural infrastructure. Any cutbacks in these services severely impact 
the welfare of the poorest groups. 
While globalization undoubtedly can potentially deliver many positive outcomes, its negative 
consequences do have to be reinforced and some gains transferred from winners to losers. In the 
next section, we will explore the nature of social security and social welfare spending across 
developed and developing countries and how has globalization impacted such spending. These 
insights make clearer the effects of globalization on marginalized groups. 
4. Globalization and Its Effects on Social Spending 
We now move on to analyze and explain the effects of globalization on social security and 
welfare spending in developed and developing countries. First, however, it is necessary to 
provide a background of the nature of social spending in developing countries and its rationale. 
We start off by defining social security, a rather vague concept whose boundaries are not well 
developed. Social security and welfare spending are often spoken of together, sometimes 
collectively referred to as “social spending”, and the remainder of this study will refer to social 
security and welfare spending as social spending. In some instances, social security may narrow 
refer to merely social insurance, whereas in some cases, social security and welfare may 
collectively also include tax-financed benefits. For the purposes of this paper, social security will 
be defined as follows: “benefits that society provides to individuals and households – through 
public and collective measures – to guarantee them a minimum standard of living and to protect 
them against low and declining living standards”, as per the definition used by Van Ginneken 
(2003). Developing countries, which often face institutional and informational barriers to erect 
social security schemes as in industrialized countries, often create alternate programs such as 
employment guarantee programs and agricultural subsidies, which are meant to serve the same 
purpose of social security and therefore can be thought of as social security measures, thus fitting 
the above definition. However, it is hoped that the use of the phrase “social spending” can do 
away with the ambiguity associated with the definitions of social security and social welfare. 
To further qualify social security, we highlight Van Ginneken’s (2003) conception of social 
security. Social security is provided in a public or community not-for-profit context and its aim is 
protection of the vulnerable; this should not be confused with goals of growth or other 
macroeconomic objectives. Social security is essentially concerned with limiting household 
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expenditure of beneficiaries on basics such as food and healthcare. The two main components of 
social security are social insurance, benefits provided in certain contingencies or capacity 
deprivations such as old age, and tax-financed benefits, targeted to the especially needy who may 
not have any contributory capacity or may be otherwise excluded from social insurance schemes 
(Van Ginneken, 2003). 
This section will first consider the nature of social spending in developing countries, followed by 
a justification of why such spending is desirable in the cases of developing countries. We then 
identify the effects of globalization on social spending in developing and developed countries, 
gain insights into particular effects in specific regions, and finally explain the factors and 
characteristics of developing countries which may be responsible for an erosion of social 
spending as a result of globalization. 
4.1 The Nature of and Need for Social Spending in Developing Countries 
We begin this section by first understanding the general nature of social spending in developing 
countries. In general, social security and welfare programs in developing countries have 
narrowly benefitted those employed in the formal sector, who constitute only a small proportion 
of the population of developing countries. This also means that the truly needy are often left out 
(Leisering, 2009). For the excluded, the family serves as the main provider of economic 
protection, particularly for the elderly; this is a key reason why developing countries are often 
unable to reduce birth rates. Support for those with no family assistance comes in the form of 
community-level support and food welfare.  
Research efforts by Rudra (2007) have identified three clusters of the type of welfare states there 
exist among developing countries. Some welfare states promote market development, and are 
labeled productive welfare states, whereas others are concerned with protecting select 
individuals from the market, and are labeled protective welfare states, while a few exhibit 
characteristics of both and are labeled dual welfare states. Productive welfare states promote 
participation in export markets and commodification of labor, which refers to the exposure of 
labor to the market in order to earn a standard of living. Governments of productive welfare 
states understand that while they need to give up some control of the economy in order to 
embrace international integration, the state-market relationship in complementary. Therefore, 
public intervention in such welfare states aims to enhance international market participation, and 
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may emphasize education, healthcare, and relevant infrastructure. Protective welfare states, on 
the other hand, emerge in economies which have had a historical tendency to avoid exposure to 
international markets, preferring the decommodification of labor instead (Rudra, 2007). 
However a country chooses to develop its welfare state, budgetary, institutional, and 
informational constraints become increasingly important in the case of low-income countries. 
This results in low-income countries initiating very different kinds of social security and welfare 
programs compared to middle-income and industrialized nations. For example, in the case of 
healthcare, many industrialized nations have achieved universal health coverage, while some 
middle-income countries are on track, such as Colombia, which favors a fast-track 
implementation, and Tunisia, which favors a more gradualist implementation. Low-income 
countries, on the other hand, do not benefit from free or even subsidized healthcare so 
community-based healthcare schemes have emerged.  
Another common social scheme poor countries may face problems with is pensions. Pensions 
typically comprise three major contingencies: old age, disability, and survivorship. Problems 
arise with respect to contributions, contributory capacity, and payouts, as self-reported incomes 
of many in developing countries are much lower than actual incomes, and such countries often 
lack the institutional apparatus to identify the true level of earnings. Tunisia is an example of a 
country that has done well integrating self-employed people into statutory self-insurance 
schemes despite such barriers; reasonable income scales have been estimated for the self-
employed, on whose basis contributions are decided. Getting around such barriers can be 
extremely advantageous as it is easier to launch pension schemes when the majority of the 
population is young, as in developing countries, which contributes more to the system than is 
taken away by the relatively few elderly. As ageing occurs gradually, the pension fund will be in 
a good position to bear the burden of the payouts at the later date. An example of a country 
which has been improving its pension system targeted to the elderly is Brazil, the largest 
economy in Latin America, a region of relatively well-developed social spending regimes among 
non-OECD nations. The minimum age to be eligible for benefits has been reduced, and poverty 
has fallen among the elderly and significantly improved family welfare. 
Besides such social insurance measures, tax-financed benefits are also crucial components of 
overall social security measures in developing countries. Many people have no contributory 
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capacity to social insurance schemes, so they rely on tax-provided social benefits. These benefits 
are often targeted to certain groups, such as widows, who often have no link to the labour 
market. Targeting is done through four main methods: income, indicators apart from income, 
community selection, or self-selection. There is considerable variation among countries 
regarding the share of responsibility for social welfare between local governments and the 
central government. However, it is argued that tax-financed benefits should be financed by the 
central government as central financing can smoothen out regional disparities in incomes, which 
is often the case among developing countries (Van Ginneken, 2003). 
We do not highlight the importance of social programs in developed countries, as the definition 
and connotation of developed countries implicitly include the presence of a comprehensive social 
net. Therefore, a further discussion of the importance of social programs in developed countries 
is superfluous. Unlike developing countries, developed countries have the resources to run social 
programs and possess the institutional and informational infrastructure to effectively distribute 
social gains. Economically and socially developed, such nations are not hard-pressed to attract 
additional capital and trade flows, unlike their developing counterparts.  
Now that we have discussed the general nature of social spending in developing countries, we 
move ahead with discussing the desirability of such spending in developing countries. This 
discussion is vital in the context of social security and welfare being traditionally associated with 
the industrialized world and developing countries being encouraged to embrace structural 
adjustment programs and extreme fiscal responsibility to benefit from growth in an increasingly 
globalized economy. In general, developing countries may experience significant inequities in 
income, as well as inequities in the accrued benefits of growth to different groups in society. 
Therefore, social security is often necessary to lead developing countries on a strategy of 
equitable growth and development (Ahmad 1991). Inequity may manifest itself in the form of 
labor standards, which may be far inferior in many industries in developing countries compared 
to their industrialized world counterparts. Besides poor wages, many workers in developing 
countries may have to endure poor physical working conditions and the lack of collective 
bargaining rights, while not enjoying the protection of minimum wage legislation. On the other 
hand, other workers, particularly in the public sector and the regulated formal sector, may enjoy 
respectable salaries with benefits and other perquisites enjoyed by workers in the industrialized 
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world (Manning, 1998). While classical development theory claims that all workers would find 
themselves in secure, formal-sector employment and enjoy such benefits, this is often not the 
case in developing countries, as evidenced by the consistently large informal sector and surplus 
labor. The onset of structural adjustment policies may have even reduced the proportion of labor 
employed in the formal sector in many developing countries (Van Ginneken, 2003). 
Such adverse effects to living standards and the precarity of the position of many as a result of 
globalization point to the increasing importance of social spending in developing countries 
undergoing major changes as a result of globalization. Globalization is often accompanied by 
other major transformations affecting a developing country, such as rapid urbanization, sectoral 
shifts in the economy caused by large-scale movements of workers from an agricultural-heavy 
rural area to manufacturing-heavy urban centers. These shifts can test traditional family – and 
community-provided welfare, which are the main sources of social security for those left out of 
formal social security measures. As workers migrate to the cities, the elderly, children, and 
others not in the labour force may not receive adequate care. Workers themselves are put under 
uncertainty as they leave traditional family agricultural or other rural jobs to find work in the 
cities (Manning, 1998). 
Many social scientists have argued that liberalization and globalization policies can adversely 
affect marginalized communities in the form of uneven regional development and wage 
disparities, ultimately leading to widespread and increasing inequity. This can be partly 
explained by the incidence of foreign direct investment (FDI), which tends to concentrate itself 
in certain regions in a given country. For example, in China, the explosion of FDI has been 
largely restricted to the relatively richer eastern provinces. FDI can boost growth, however, if 
FDI is benefitting only a segment of the population which may be already relatively well-off 
compared to others in other regions, then FDI will only exacerbate regional inequality (Khan, 
1997). A study analyzing the effect of liberalization policies on the standard of living of low-
income salaried workers in the Indian state of West Bengal found that the overwhelming 
majority of respondents condemned such policies for benefitting only an already elite minority. 
The respondents further claimed a fall in living standards and real wages as a result of 
globalization. Such findings are not isolated to India; evidence from Latin America, the Middle 
East, Africa, and elsewhere has provided credence to the argument that market reform generally 
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benefits the rich while further marginalizing the poor (Ganguly-Scrase & Scrase, 2001). Such 
circumstances make ripe conditions for political and social unrest, and developing countries must 
maintain social stability alongside market expansion. Today’s rich countries did not pay much 
attention to maintaining social stability while they developed and grew, which led to unrest and 
creating the necessary conditions leading to World War I. Now, developing countries have a 
precedent in the form of the disastrous consequences that can occur as a result of social 
instability (Rudra, 2007).  
The transformation to globalization in many countries were also accompanied by changes in the 
structure of employment, particularly in the manufacturing sector. In the periods before the onset 
of reform, employment in industry was structured such that the level of employment was far 
greater than needed to produce the volume of goods that was manufactured. Such a system, 
meant to offer a level of social protection, was not sustainable in the era of reform, and this 
surplus labour began to find itself unemployed once reform was underway. This phenomenon 
resulted in a very low output elasticity of demand in countries such as China, India, Vietnam, 
and Pakistan, leading to a “jobless growth” or even an increase in unemployment, lasting years 
after reform was initiated (Khan, 1997). These findings provide strong justifications for the 
creation of social security and welfare programs even in developing countries, especially those 
undergoing economic and social transformations related to globalization.  
4.2 Effects of Globalization on Social Spending in Developing and Developed Countries 
We have highlighted how developing countries can benefit from social spending, particularly in 
times of change associated with globalization. However, what is the effect of globalization itself 
on social spending? This section details the analysis of globalization on social spending in both 
developed and developing countries, based on theory and evidence. These findings will enable us 
to determine the reasons behind particular patterns of social spending in developing countries as 
a result of globalization. This study is crucial to analyzing these reasons as it allows us to proffer 
informed policy options to ensure robust social spending to protect the marginalized groups in 
society. We first present two theoretical viewpoints: the strong globalization hypothesis and the 
related diminished democracy hypothesis. We then present findings from empirical studies to 
show how these hypotheses are validated – and challenged depending on the circumstances. 
Finally, the insights gleaned from this subsection will be enriched by the analysis presented in 
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the next subsection, which will highlight region-specific patterns and trends. Together, these 
findings will help us understand the reasons behind the effect of globalization on social 
spending, which will be discussed in the final subsection of this section. 
Firstly, the ‘strong globalization’ hypothesis is put forward by many scholars to predict the 
effects of globalization on a country’s domestic policy. This view has emerged and gained 
traction since about the early 1980s and it posits that increased openness constrains government 
spending and increased capital mobility constrains tax goals (Rudra & Haggard, 2005). 
According to this hypothesis, capital mobility creates pressures to reduce business tax to attract 
foreign capital and foreign direct investment (FDI). The globalization of capital markets has 
made capital very powerful and any goals of redistributive taxation simply cannot be reconciled 
with the goals of attracting capital from abroad (Swank, 1998). The global economy is 
dominated by uncontrollable global forces where transnational corporations (TNCs) are the 
principal actors with agency who can choose to relocate whenever and wherever they so choose 
(Yeats, 2002). Besides capital mobility, increased trade integration also leads to similar 
situations as pressures to facilitate trade competitiveness emerge. 
In a world of footloose capital, countries compete with each other to offer the most attractive 
conditions and circumstances for capital. Countries engage in a bidding war in a ‘race to the 
bottom’ by offering fewer protections to labor and labor standards, minimal tax burdens, and 
other policies aligned with business interests. The hypothesis argues that there is convergence 
among countries in their domestic policy as a result of the race to the bottom. To accommodate a 
reduction in taxes, governments must give up their ability to provide public services and social 
rights. Being the domain of social democratic parties and unions, these bodies are likely to lose 
influence (Swank, 1998). Conventional wisdom dictates that markets are driven by a neoliberal 
agenda, and governments must appease such an agenda to continue to attract capital and keep 
themselves in the good books of the market (Yeats, 2002). Therefore, governments would stay 
clear of redistributive programs and other interventions of which the market does not approve, as 
such welfare benefits are not considered good market-discipling devices on labor (Rudra, 2002). 
This marks the decline of social democratic politics upon which the welfare state is built.  
This leads us to our second and related hypothesis, the ‘diminished democracy’ hypothesis, 
according to which the government loses significant control of domestic policy to appease to 
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foreign parties. This perspective is a natural consequence of the strong globalization hypothesis. 
Ultimately, the two hypotheses together argue that universal welfare systems are gradually 
replaced by selectivist welfare states, states where the government plays a much reduced role in 
the provision of welfare (Yeats, 2002). In general, the market considers only education as an 
acceptable form of state support (Ramesh, 2004). Therefore, selectivist welfare states are those 
likely to intervene to the extent of providing goods and services to improve human and physical 
capital. 
What does this theoretical background imply for the future of welfare states? Are welfare states 
destined to crumble under the weight of globalization? Significant empirical evidence shows the 
contrary, however, but it largely concerns industrialized countries. Empirical studies conducted 
by Garrett (1995) and Swank (1998) have found no systematic decline in taxes and welfare 
spending due to globalization (Ramesh, 2004). Even as capital has become more mobile and 
countries more inclined to attract capital, business tax burdens in OECD countries have been 
maintained or even slightly increased in the wake of the globalization of financial markets. 
Countries have developed new ‘market-conforming’ rules for business taxation which give less 
importance to the economic management functions of tax policy while leaving intact its revenue-
generating roles.  
This can be witnessed by the increase in social security and payroll taxes throughout the 1970s, 
designed to enable the expansion of welfare benefits. While tax reform in the 1980s in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and other advanced nations resulted in the reduction of corporate taxes, 
reform also included base-broadening, for example, through the elimination of investment 
reliefs. Such reforms have been instituted to work towards two key principles: the net change in 
tax proceeds as a consequence of the reform should be revenue-neutral; and specific targets for 
elimination, once seen as necessary to attract investment, were now on viewed as inefficient 
(Swank, 1998).  
In fact, a body of research studies shows how globalization is supported by the presence of a 
robust welfare state, and how the two reinforce each other. Globalization and social welfare can 
be viewed as complementary; social protection is essential for trade and investment 
liberalization, as in the absence of such protection, political groups would emerge to oppose 
globalization and call for protectionism (Reiger & Leibfried 2003). Even this research for the 
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most part, however, concerns industrialized countries, and the scarce research devoted to 
understanding the dynamics at play in developing countries finds more severe impacts to social 
welfare (Ramesh, 2004).  
Geoffrey Garrett challenges the notion of the crumbling welfare state under the pressures of 
globalization; he argues instead that international integration induces greater government 
spending on redistribution to compensate for the inequities generated through the market process 
(Rudra, 2002). Evidence from Western Europe shows that there has not been any radical 
dismantling of the welfare state in response to globalization pressures. In fact, welfare states are 
most robust and least likely to erode in more open countries with stronger globalization 
pressures. Meanwhile, Rieger and Leibfried (1998) further argue that more radical changes to the 
institutional structure of social policy are more likely in countries with less intense international 
links and lower national dependency on world markets. 
This corroborates with historical experience if we analyze the growth of globalization in the 
post-war era. We need to better understand the role played by the institutions of social welfare in 
developing international openness on a large scale. The institutionalization of income 
maintenance programs introduced after World War 2 allowed governments to undertake free 
trade policies. It was due to the Great Depression that the welfare state was born after World War 
2 and contemporary economists and political scientists agreed that the rise of the welfare state as 
the new social order of the industrialized democratic world would allow the global economy to 
return to the levels of international integration that were prevalent at the eve of World War 1. 
Structures of social policy in heavily globalized economies have contained movements and 
trends arising out of globalization, bringing about a certain level of stability to the degree that 
such structures could viably replace protectionism. When interest groups feel threatened by 
reforms to the welfare state or economic insecurity as a result of globalization and liberalization, 
coalitions develop to call for protectionism and resist domestic deregulation. The more 
individual subsistence is dependent on the market, such as the commodification of labor, and the 
more market outcomes are determined by external events, the more individuals become risk-
averse. In such cases, protectionism is a very appealing alternative. However, if there is an 
expansive social safety net to smoothen the blow which serves as an alternative means for 
subsistence without dependence on the market, then protectionism is superfluous and serves no 
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purpose. Therefore, the establishment of a welfare state can be seen as crucial to maintaining 
broad support for international integration and maintain a high level of international division of 
labor. This has become particularly important as the primacy of national welfare has become 
ever more pronounced throughout the twentieth century. 
Rieger and Leibfried (1998) present evidence from the United States and Western Europe to 
support their argument that with increasing economic openness and integration, social policy is 
less likely to wane as governments have lesser freedom to alter it. The United States was able to 
radically change its welfare policy in 1996; reform involved the end of welfare as a right 
accompanied by restrictions on benefits. This shows how a country experiencing a relatively low 
level of globalization pressure is able to make major changes to its social welfare programs. 
Meanwhile, the high level of external pressure experienced by Western European nations 
significantly affects their ability to undertake any such radical changes (Riger & Leibfried, 
1998). 
Rodrik (1998) contributes to this discussion and believes that government expenditure serves the 
purpose of providing social insurance against external risk. Societies demand and receive an 
expanded role by the government as a price for accepting a larger external risk. If government 
expenditure is sizeable and consistent, it can help mitigate some riskiness in household income 
due to external shocks. A study by Cameron (1978) involving 18 rich countries found that more 
open economies have higher rates of industrial concentration, which helps foster higher 
unionization rates and greater scope for collective bargaining, resulting in larger demands for 
government transfers. However, such studies, and the theory developed to explain such findings, 
are for the most part applicable only to industrialized countries, and therefore may not be 
applicable to the case of India. The adverse impact of openness on welfare spending has been 
identified in the case of poor countries, including, with respect to some measures, India. 
The theory that developing countries are expected to converge on neoliberal policies in a race to 
the bottom is evidenced by the negative correlation between expanding international markets and 
social spending. In the interval between the early 1970s and mid-1990s, social welfare spending 
in 53 LDCs declined from 3.2% to 2.5% of overall gross domestic product (GDP). During the 
same period, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries 
experienced a corresponding increase in their welfare spending from 12% to 16% of GDP 
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(Ramesh, 2004). The case with LDCs applies to India too, where the policy in the 1980s and 
1990s emphasized fiscal contraction. For example, gross capital formation in agriculture 
amounted to 4.2% of the agricultural GDP in 1979, and steadily fell to 1.6% in 1989, before 
somewhat recovering to 3.7% in 2006 (Ramachandran, 2010). These findings, while complying 
with the strong globalization and diminished democracy hypotheses, conflict with the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem, which predicts that unskilled and low-skilled workers in developing 
countries should benefit from trade and openness. As low-skilled workers are likely to benefit 
from welfare, the cutting back of welfare harms such groups the most. Therefore, the strong 
globalization and diminished democracy hypotheses must be given consideration when 
evaluating social spending effects in developing countries, even though thee experience of 
developed countries renders these hypotheses largely questionable. 
Particularly in developing countries, public and private expenditure are complementary. State 
withdrawal from public programs of employment and infrastructure harms the countryside by 
removing key avenues for growth and poverty alleviation. This withdrawal has greatly affected 
the amount of employment people get in rural India. Many of the backward classes have been 
adversely affected by contractions in rural employment. These classes are far worse off as their 
marginalization anyway precludes them from gaining access to lucrative markets, and so they 
required government assistance in the form of employment to secure a certain standard of living 
(Ganguly-Scrase & Scrase, 2001).  
A key form of social support in India is the Public Distribution System (PDS), the government-
run subsidized food program and a lifeline to millions. The period of openness and globalization 
has been associated with a narrower targeting of the PDS, which has excluded many genuinely 
needy former beneficiaries. Moreover, agricultural food subsidy has declined around 2006, after 
being steady since the 1960s, as a percentage of GDP. As shown by evidence, India has 
witnessed some level of decline in its social spending, however, there have also been some 
success stories, such as the passage and implementation of the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (NREGA), a job guarantee scheme which has been implemented in a phased 
manner in many parts of rural India. While the NREGA has been criticized for many cases of 
non-payment of the mandated benefits and the restricted type of work available, it is a step in the 
right direction (Ramachandran, 2010). In general, therefore, India’s experience calls for some 
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understanding of the strong globalization hypothesis where social spending is reduced to 
discipline markets, however, a nuanced perspective is called for given the implementation of the 
significant NREGA schemes. 
This divergence in the impact on welfare spending as a result of globalization raises questions 
about the characteristics of developing and developed countries that determine the level of social 
spending. Gaining insight into these factors can help developing countries and their people in 
identifying policies to protect social security and welfare. The next section will discuss findings 
from particular regions, followed by a discussion of the factors determining social security and 
welfare levels.  
4.3 Globalization and Social Spending – Insights from Particular Regions 
This subsection explains the association between the increasing extent of globalization and social 
spending in particular regions, specifically East Asia and South Asia. We hope that differences in 
the effect on social spending as a result of globalization within and between regions will shed 
light on the causes of the divergence between developed and developing countries with respect to 
changes in social spending as a result of globalization identified in the previous section. 
As many East Asian countries opened up to the global economy by embarking on a path of 
export-oriented industrialization, they experienced an unprecedented shift from agriculture and 
the informal sector to the manufacturing sector in urban areas. Urban areas witnessed high levels 
of migration and labor was always available for the growing manufacturing sector. Quite 
possibly due to this surge in surplus labor, wages rose very slowly at first and improvements in 
labor conditions and labor rights lagged behind even wage growth. This experience of East Asian 
countries provides lessons for India, as well as other countries, that even a sudden growth and 
compositional shift in industry will not quickly raise wages (Manning, 1998). 
Laws restricting collective bargaining and unionization rights of workers have exacerbated the 
suppression of wages and work conditions in many parts of East Asia, leading to disputes in 
many countries being settled in favor of employers. However, notable exceptions include the 
democratic nations of Korea and Taiwan, where workers have managed to secure improvements 
in protective worker legislation and union freedom. These countries also enjoy higher education 
and income levels than many others in East Asia, highlighting the importance of worker 
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education and awareness to worker protection. In terms of social spending, Korea and Taiwan 
have also managed to achieve universal health coverage due to their political commitment. This 
was made possible due to their high level of democratization, urbanization, and high proportion 
of employment in the formal sector (Van Ginneken, 2003). 
These countries did not start off this way. Korea began pursuing export-oriented industrialization 
as an authoritarian regime in the 1960s, at a time when labor conditions were harsh and union 
activity was controlled. Only from the 1980s onwards, when Korea embarked on a path of 
democratization, were labour protections reformed. At the same time, Korea experienced a 
restructuring of employment away from relatively low-skilled labor-intensive manufacturing 
towards high-tech machinery and chemicals. Another example is Indonesia, which too 
experienced major changes to labor protection, such as a more than doubling of the minimum 
wage, during a time of export-oriented industrialization and democratization. These changes 
emerged as a response to industrial unrest and growing concern over labor conditions. 
Consequently, Malaysia began its strategy of export-oriented industrialization with labor 
conditions not as harsh as in Indonesia or Korea. However, labor conditions and rights were not 
improved over time in Malaysia. These observations point to the importance of democratization 
in determining the direction and intensity of social spending in developing countries (Manning, 
1998), and therefore, ensuring that democratic institutions maintain their integrity is vital to 
protect labor rights and conditions. 
In countries in South and East Asia which began much of their liberalization and globalization 
later, there were different consequences of globalization. While many South Asian countries 
enjoyed sustained poverty alleviation before embarking on a path towards globalization, poverty 
rates flattened or even rose soon after policies encouraging globalization, often through structural 
adjustment programs, were implemented. India enjoyed significant poverty alleviation from the 
1960s, but this markedly slowed when globalization reforms began in the 1980s. Bangladesh 
actually experienced a rise in poverty level once trade reforms gained momentum in the 1980s, 
after many years of falling poverty. Poverty rose even in Pakistan in the late 1980s after 
structural adjustment policies encouraging trade were implemented. 
This trend was not isolated to South Asia. China began systematic reform focusing on rural areas 
from the late 1970s and achieved a dramatic decline in poverty levels. However, once China 
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began reforms focused on trade and globalization from the mid-1980s onwards, the pace of 
poverty alleviation declined sharply. This has much to do with the very low absorption of labor 
in new industrial enterprises. As a form of social protection, many state-owned enterprises 
provided employment to far more than was needed to achieve the necessary production. Once 
state-owned enterprises gave way to private enterprises, this form of social support evaporated 
and was not replaced by other forms of support. This was seen in India and Pakistan as well, 
where there was virtually no employment growth in the 1990s even though output grew (Khan, 
1997).  
Disruptions to poverty alleviation and employment point to inadequate social spending 
throughout South Asia. For example, in India, informal workers receive virtually no social 
insurance or other forms of state protection. State-level pensions reach only a small fraction of 
the entitled. Eligible claimants often lack information about programs and how to claim benefits 
and corruption and bureaucracy take their toll on benefits given out. In China, as in India, 
informal workers are excluded from social insurance schemes (Ahmad, 1991). 
Among developing countries, Latin American nations are the ones which benefit from relatively 
sophisticated social spending measures to cover vulnerable populations. Those Latin American 
nations which have managed to extend social insurance coverage beyond the formal sector, such 
as Chile and Costa Rica, tend to be those with a modern and unionized rural workforce. Brazil is 
another example of a Latin American nation attempting to improve its pension system. Reforms 
to the pension system have already positively impacted family welfare, particularly in rural areas 
(Van Ginneken, 2003). 
4.4 Determinants of Social Spending in the Face of Globalization – Explaining the Divergence 
The last two sections have shed some light on why social spending responds in different ways to 
increasing levels of globalization in different countries and regions. Recurring themes include 
differences in the levels of democratization, varying levels of surplus labor, and unionization 
levels across countries. We now use the insights gathered from literature and the previous 
sections to identify and explain the determinants of the direction of social spending as a response 
to increasing levels of globalization. These determinants are interdependent of each other and 
together create a cohesive picture of the impact of globalization on social spending, which can 
then be applied to the case of India to create recommendations. 
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The focus of political science studies often center on labor, and an important difference between 
developed and developing countries which is thought to affect social spending is the extent of 
surplus labor in the economy. A large proportion of surplus labor in the economy drives down 
wages, conditions of work, and labor law as surplus, underemployed workers are more 
concerned with merely finding work and weaken collective bargaining structures (Manning, 
1998). In the same vein, another crucial variable is the proportion of informal labor in the 
economy. Many types of social spending which are based on labor can function only when the 
majority of workers are employed in the formal sector. An example is social health insurance, as 
evidenced by the cases of Korea and Taiwan, which were able to launch such schemes only 
when they attained a highly formalized and urbanized labor force and a generally developed 
economy. Another example is pension schemes; low-income and even middle-income countries 
characterized by a high level of informal employment and unreported self-employment, and 
associated tax evasion, find it difficult to initiate such programs in a logistical sense as they 
simply cannot estimate the true level of incomes (Van Ginneken, 2003). 
The problem of surplus labor leads into the broader problem of collective bargaining and 
unionization. What is crucial is not just the unionization rate, which varies significantly even 
within developed countries and is not particularly meaningful, but also the nature of 
unionization. The mere participation and existence of unions does not guarantee effective union 
strength as in many countries, unions are unable to meaningfully engage in collective bargaining. 
One key reason is the education and awareness levels of workers. Low-skilled workers are 
difficult to mobilize due to their low education levels and the often erratic hours worked 
(Ramesh, 2004). Low education and awareness levels also make it easier to suppress union 
integrity and independence. The cases of Korea and Taiwan again demonstrate that 
improvements in worker education and awareness were major causes behind genuine demands 
for stronger unions and better conditions, which noticeably boosted social spending and labor 
rights (Manning, 1998), and stronger labor confederations lead to greater demands for 
government transfers (Rodrik, 1998). 
The other key factor behind the effectiveness of unions to reach their desired aims is the level of 
independence allowed by the union, and more generally, the democratic and legal framework 
under which unions can legitimately negotiate (Manning, 1998). This leads into a broader 
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discussion about the importance of democratic institutions and the respect for democracy among 
governments. While labour is in important determinant of social spending, it is not the only 
important factor as in many countries, increases in social spending cannot be attributed to labor; 
meanwhile, certain countries with an educated and generally scarce labor force still are unable to 
achieve any increases in social spending. Understanding the role played by democracy and 
democratic institutions helps us solve another piece of the puzzle (Ramesh, 2004). 
Empirical evidence shows us that social spending in developing countries is much more sensitive 
in the face of globalization in authoritarian regimes than democratic ones. There are several 
reasons for this. Democracy involves electoral competition which means that policy converges to 
the interests of the median voter, who is very likely to benefit from some kind of social spending. 
Furthermore, democracy is associated with greater redistribution and the provision of public 
goods, which maintain even during globalization pressures (Rudra & Haggard, 2005). 
Parliamentarization has allowed the use of political means and institutions for economic ends. In 
a democratic environment, where everyone has one vote regardless of their socioeconomic 
situation, political institutions are forced to take into account the needs of vulnerable classes 
(Rieger & Leibfried, 1998). Even democratic environments headed by strong neoliberal agendas, 
such as Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s United States found it difficult to cut back social 
spending beyond a certain point (Swank, 1998). 
Besides the idea of democratic institutions, what is also considered to be significant is the 
general ideological underpinning of political institutions and policymaking and where policy 
falls on the political spectrum. For example, societies with social democratic underpinnings are 
believed to respond differently with respect to social spending than societies with more 
conservative underpinnings. The importance of institutions is a reflection of a broader 
acknowledgement of the influence and agency of domestic factors in determining the impacts on 
social spending as a result of globalization, a refutation of the Diminished Democracy hypothesis 
discussed earlier. What tends to matter is how much nations are interested in taking care of their 
vulnerable groups vis-à-vis encouraging globalization and what incentives they are faced from 
each direction (Ramesh, 2004). 
Incentives in support of social spending, as an extension to the importance of democratic 
institutions, come in the form of a strong civil society, which is a hallmark of a democratic 
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nation. Civil society consists of grassroots movements as well as stablished non-government 
organizations and often speak out for groups marginalized due to globalization. Such groups can 
pressurize the government to maintain, and even increase, social spending in the face of 
globalization (Ramesh, 2004). Quite related is the pressure of interest groups. Democracies 
provide more space for the organization of diverse interest groups to be heard. While different 
interest groups have different objectives, it is the elderly who are particularly vocal about 
preserving and expanding social spending. Therefore, democratic countries with a higher 
proportion of the elderly in their population are even more likely to act more to preserve social 
spending (Rudra & Haggard, 2005) and more strongly resist reductions in taxes which fund such 
spending (Swank, 1998). 
Building off a point previously mentioned, another important determinant of how social 
spending responds to globalization is the current level of globalization itself. While the current 
level of globalization may not have a direct relation with whether a country is developing or 
developed, it is important to note that developed nations are more likely to be integrated into the 
international economy as the developing world is still catching on. This is a very broad and crude 
generalization as variables more likely to matter include size; a small nation is more likely to be 
integrated into the global economy. However, given that the importance of the current extent of 
globalization and its effect on social spending is acknowledged in literature, we have chosen to 
include this here. 
According to a study by David Cameron, more open economies are associated with greater rates 
of industrial concentration, which is conducive to higher unionization levels, taking us back to 
our argument about unionization and its impact on social spending. However, there are also more 
direct reasons for this relationship (Rodrik, 1998). Increased integration results in the economy 
being increasingly reliant on events and occurrences outside its control, by which the economy 
becomes more vulnerable to external shocks. This increased volatility raises demands for 
government action in the form of social spending as any fluctuations in household income 
resulting from external events can be compensated by government intervention. Particularly in 
pluralistic, democratic environments, the government is compelled to provide security as a cost 
in order to win the acceptance for globalization. As increased levels of globalization are 
considered widely beneficial, this cost of providing security to citizens is a worthwhile 
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investment as, in the absence of such redistributive measures, interest groups opposing 
globalization and demanding protectionist policies will appear. The provision of social security 
to encourage globalization is a means to avoid calls for more protectionist measures (Rieger & 
Leibfried, 1998). 
When a safety net is provided, increased levels of globalization can be seen as opportunities as 
opposed to threats. High levels of social spending reduce opposition to globalization and are key 
in facilitating high levels of openness, as has been the case in the Post-War era. Moreover, quite 
as a result of high levels of openness, the levels of social spending become ‘sticky’; they are 
increasingly hard to touch. It is important to note that such observations apply to nations with 
other favorable attributes to the maintenance of social spending: democratic institutions, labor 
power, and developed economies. Yet, even within this space, it can be seen that the effect of 
openness plays a major role. Germany and the United States, two major industrialized, 
democratic nations, differ in their level of openness, with Germany being the far more open 
economy. Between these two countries, Germany enjoys a higher level of social spending with a 
stronger structure of social spending; in the United States, on the other hand, interventions in the 
institutional structure of social policy are more likely (Rieger & Leibfried, 1998). 
5. Lessons for India 
We will now consider the above determinants of social spending and apply them to the case of 
India with the objective of allowing India to maintain its social spending as it continues to 
integrate itself into the world economy. This section will be divided as follows. First, we will 
collate the recommendations as per the previously cited studies and papers. Second, we will 
further describe the Indian context with respect to the determinants of divergence in social 
spending between developing and developed countries; this will help us identify where India 
stands with respect to developing countries as a whole. Third, we will tie in all of the above and 
create recommendations for the case of India. 
5.1 General Lessons 
As developing countries often lack the institutional and informational base to launch widespread 
social programs similar to those in developed countries, recommendations catered to developing 
countries regarding their social spending often involves different dimensions such as direct 
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employment creation and assistance to marginalized groups with a view of placing them in a 
position from where they would be able to take advantage of the opportunities available in an 
increasingly open economy. Indeed, ‘conventional’ methods of protection such as unemployment 
insurance are typically relevant only for middle-income and wealthier countries which have a 
large proportion of their workforce employed in the formal sector (Van Ginneken, 2003). 
Employment guarantees are often suggested in relation to developing countries, with an alternate 
option based on local targeting for those unable to work or the indigent. Since targeting may be 
difficult in developing countries where information about people cannot be accurately verified, 
these employment guarantee programs are often recommended on a self-targeted basis through 
relatively low wages and unskilled work (Ahmad, 1991). These schemes have a significant 
advantage in that they serve as buffer programs for people who are trying to adjust to a swiftly 
changing economy which requires different skills and offers different work environments 
(Rudra, 2002).  
Employment guarantee programs are crucial for the rural poor who are the most likely to suffer 
from any reduction in government spending as such reductions often target secure rural 
employment. Socially disadvantaged groups such as women also depend on these schemes as 
finding employment elsewhere may prove very difficult. Their general marginality in society 
poses barriers of entry into lucrative industries and employment guarantees can give them a 
much-needed head start (Ganguly-Scrase & Scrase, 2001). Such schemes work towards the 
longer-term purpose of commodifying labor so workers can seek lucrative employment 
opportunities in an increasingly globalized economy. Given Rudra’s distinction between 
protective and productive welfare states, Rudra advises that nations can develop more efficient 
social spending schemes if they focus on commodifying labor; employment guarantees are a 
strong step forward (Rudra, 2007). 
The commodification of labor goes hand-in-hand with the provision of skills and development of 
human capital to the end of equipping people with the skills and traits needed to succeed in an 
increasingly globalized economy (Gunter & Van Der Hoeven, 2004). A steady expansion in 
skills over time will allow the country to serve as a useful skill ladder for TNCs; this will help 
ensure that workers enjoy better working conditions and consequently improved labor rights. 
Factors such as poor worker power and poor labor laws and standards are often derivatives of 
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low worker awareness and skill levels so providing education and training to make workers more 
productive will help workers access better working conditions (Manning, 1998). Workers should 
be trained in such that the skill divide between developing and developed nations is bridged and 
skills in demand globally should be stressed upon, particularly digital and technical skills. This 
goes along with the provision of such skills and a higher quality of education at lower levels too, 
such as primary education (Gunter & Van Der Hoeven, 2004). 
As low-income countries lack the necessary information and institutions to disburse appropriate 
social spending to needy groups, commentators highlight the role of community action and 
programs implemented at the community level and encourage governments to support such 
programs. This occurs, for example, in the case of healthcare. As poor countries lack universal 
health coverage, community-level health insurance schemes have sprouted and governments can 
support and build off such schemes. Community-based schemes are also recommended to target 
social spending to workers in the informal sector as more information about their incomes and 
work conditions would be available to members of the community as opposed to governments. 
Microfinance, for example, is a popular intervention to assist informal sector workers and 
governments can provide assistance and partner with microfinance organizations (Van Ginneken, 
2003). 
Commentators also call for interest groups to voice out their demands to maintain social 
spending, particularly the elderly and their supporters who carry an ever-increasing influence as 
countries age. Such interest groups should mobilize and support left-leaning organizations and 
political entities which advocate for social spending. Civil society in general must follow suit too 
(Ramesh, 2004). 
Finally, there is an international dimension to the recommended policy landscape. The problem 
of developing countries facing an adverse effect to their social spending as a result of 
globalization is a general effect and not isolated to any one country. This is to some extent a 
reflection of the power imbalances between developing countries and TNCs, as supported by the 
Strong Globalization and Diminished Democracy hypotheses; there needs to be, therefore, 
coordination among developing countries in terms of policymaking to fight such converging 
tendencies as the two hypotheses suggest (Gunter & Van Der Hoeven, 2004). 
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International organizations are increasingly becoming involved in the realm of social spending. 
Traditionally the preserve of the International Labour Organization (ILO), social spending as a 
concern has since the 1980s been a topic of discussion even among the World Bank and the IMF. 
This presents an opportunity for international mobilization among unions to preserve their 
common goals and pressure their governments simultaneously to bring about action (Ramesh, 
2004). 
India can also learn from other countries in similar situations. For example, Indonesia has begun 
reforming social security through the National Social Security System Law passed in 2004. 
Notably, this scheme, known as Jamsosnas, will cover every citizen in Indonesia, including 
informal workers. The scheme calls for mandatory contributions shared between employers and 
employees totaling around 18% of the salary of a formal worker and a smaller percentage of the 
salary of an informal worker as the former are expected to subsidize the latter. There are various 
agencies which cover different aspects of social security such as pensions and healthcare, and an 
entire agency will be dedicated to the provision of social security to informal workers. An 
admirably comprehensive effort to provide security to vulnerable groups, Indonesia provides an 
important lesson for India. However, such programs come with logistical challenges including 
the means of collection of the contribution from informal workers (Arifianto, 2004).  
Meanwhile, Malaysia operates the Workmen’s Compensation Scheme, an injury coverage 
scheme designed specifically for casual workers who are not covered by formal social security. 
This includes coverage for foreign migrant workers, who form a large proportion of informal and 
casual workers in Malaysia. Under this scheme, workers are eligible for medical and 
rehabilitation benefits for injuries arising out of their job tasks. India has much to learn from this 
scheme, given that many informal workers in India are domestic migrant workers, with a small 
number of migrant workers from Nepal. The Malaysian Social Security Organisation (Socso) 
emphasizes the need to build a strong information technology backbone where data about 
employees and employers is accessible so government agencies can effectively manage 
contributions to the system and claims by beneficiaries (Lee, 2002). 
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5.2 The Indian Context 
This section presents the Indian context with respect to the important determinants of social 
spending we found earlier. This context will provide valuable insight in order to craft informed 
recommendations for India.  
Extent of Informal and Casual Labor 
We have found that a larger informal sector makes it harder for governments to provide social 
services due to a lack of information, and the difficulty in targeting. Meanwhile, informal sector 
workers are not protected under worker protection legislation, making them further vulnerable. 
We now discuss the situation with informal workers in India. 
The informal sector dominates employment in India, and the vast majority of employees – 93% - 
are either employed in the informal sector or only casually employed in the formal sector. 
Workers benefit from no benefits, healthcare, or security, and do not have access to social 
measures such as pensions (Basole & Basu, 2011). Informal workers are also not represented by 
unions and thus have no bargaining power (Dibyendu, Saha, & Sen, 2013). The size of the 
informal workforce has significantly grown over time, including the reform-era decade of the 
1990s. Major industries which have begun operations in India have been characterized by a low 
employment elasticity of output, preferring the route of capital intensity despite low labor costs 
(Basole & Basu, 2011). 
This rather baffling situation can be explained by India’s strict and highly restrictive labor laws, 
which remain among the most protective in the developing world. They, however, only apply to 
workers in the formal sector, where unionization rates remain high. Workers have actively 
fought for their rights and even during the era of liberalization and globalization measures, 
India’s sophisticated labor market framework and regulation has been left largely intact but it 
protects only a small minority of all employees. Using loopholes in the legislation, corporations 
actively seeking flexibility have managed to bring in workers which are contract workers who do 
not benefit from any such legislation and labor protection. The result is a highly segmented labor 
market where the formal sector employees are distinguished by higher education and skill levels, 
labor protection and bargaining, and a poverty rate of only 4.3% among them in the year 2007. 
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Meanwhile, casual workers are characterized by their lower education and skill attainment, no 
protective legislation, and a poverty rate of 20.4% among them (Dibyendu, Saha, & Sen, 2013). 
Corporations seeking flexibility in their labor operations have promulgated an increase in casual 
and informal sector employees, ironically as a result of highly protective labor regulation (Basole 
& Basu, 2011). This can be seen more clearly on a state-level; states with more stricter labor law 
tend to see a greater increase in the use of contracted labor or non-core tasks being subcontracted 
to informal sector firms (Dibyendu, Saha, & Sen, 2013). 
Surplus Labor and Underemployment 
India has historically been home to a large amount of surplus labor in agriculture, which has 
been considered a tool for development; a virtually unlimited supply of cheap labor for industry 
(Krishnamurty, 2008). Farming in India is neither large-scale nor mechanized (Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 2010), leading to a situation where too many people cultivating too little land 
(Krishnamurty, 2008).  
Along the same lines, the problem of underemployment and seasonal unemployment has been 
noted. Even while many farmers have much work during the high season, there are simply very 
few non-agricultural employment opportunities in rural areas, leading to much unemployment 
during the off-season. Also prevalent is the presence of disguised unemployment through the 
diversion of labor from more productive to less productive industries, particularly in relation to 
the decline of the traditional handicraft industry. The presence of the disguised unemployed and 
the underemployed dilute the bargaining power of the entire workforce as these workers are 
willing to work below the going wage and without the generally accepted level of benefits; their 
concern is to simply find relatively productive work (Krishnamurty, 2008). 
Unionization and Labor Representation 
While the extent of informal, surplus, and underemployed labor provide insight into the 
condition of the bargaining power of workers in India, creating a richer and more complete 
picture requires an examination of the nature and legal circumstances of unions in the country. 
This examination reflects the rather complicated nature of unionization in India and its 
consequent effects. 
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The most significant piece of legislation which affects bargaining rights and the relationship 
between employees and employers is the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), passed in the year 1947, 
the year India achieved independence, and amended several times since. It is this act, which 
applies to all firms with at least 50 employees, which results in among the most protective 
worker legislation in the developing world. While initially applicable only to firms with 300 
employees, pressure from trade unions and other labor-focused organizations resulted in the 
subsequent amendments, making the law applicable to smaller firms and increasing the law’s 
scope (D’Souza, 2008). 
However, the IDA left enough loopholes for businesses to exploit and undermine labor rights. 
The government had the right to allow or refuse a company from laying off workers and the 
decision depended on large part the ideological leanings of the particular government in power; 
when the right-wing National Democratic Alliance (NDA; the government also in power today) 
was in power, firms found it easier to obtain permission to lay off workers. Other loopholes firms 
could actively take advantage of included arbitrarily breaking up their production units into 
smaller units and thus escaping the purview of the law. Meanwhile, entire sections of workers 
were excluded from unions and did not come under the IDA; these workers comprise the 
informal and casual workers and this distinction resulted in the highly segmented labor market as 
described earlier. Thus, those workers who benefited from unionization enjoyed strong labor 
rights and conditions as well as government support; however, the majority of workers who did 
not enjoy labor protection and unionization suffered poor labor conditions and wages and 
virtually no government support (Hensman, 2010). 
Civil Society 
The segmentation of labor leads us to consider the role played by civil society to protect the 
rights and freedoms of labor, particularly labor not protected by unions. India’s strong 
democratic framework today supports a broad and active civil society genuinely serving various 
groups in society. However, it was not always such. In the first few decades after independence, 
the government served as provider and protector to all and so the citizenry became depoliticized, 
and civil society was solely the domain of the English-literate elite. However, as India embraced 
globalization and liberalization and vulnerable groups were exposed to the vagaries of the 
market, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) cropped up to take up issues previously left to 
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the state. Thus, India’s pluralistic civil society sector was born. The years in the new millennium 
has witnessed a rapid increase in the rise of civil society organizations and grassroots 
movements. While reflective of a strong democratic environment, the gaps filled in by such 
organizations point to a reduced role played by the government in protecting vulnerable groups 
(Sahoo, 2008). 
However, with regards to fighting for the rights of ununionized and informal sector workers, 
action was limited. Struggle for such workers existed nominally in some states but was very 
fragmented and did not achieve any positive outcomes. A more united and coherent struggle may 
have helped improve the rights and conditions of such workers through lobbying and influencing 
legislation (Hensman, 2010). 
Democratic Framework 
India enjoys a robust and genuine democratic framework, with competition among political 
parties driving policymaking. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global Democracy Index has 
consistently ranked India as a flawed democracy, which also applies to countries such as the 
United States and France (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). Meanwhile, Freedom House has 
consistently ranked India as “free”, recognizing India’s active and pluralistic political makeup 
and the federal nature of the country, resulting in a division of power between the central and 
state levels (Freedom House, 2018). In this sense, India is at a stronger position to defend social 
spending compared to many other developing countries, which do not benefit from the same 
level of democratic framework. 
Within this democratic framework, leftist organizations and parties have been vocal about 
protecting social spending and provided a genuine voice to ensure that vulnerable groups are 
looked after in a rapidly changing and globalizing economic environment. Continued agitation 
and direct action by the Left has slowed down the decline in social spending over time. 
Moreover, intervention and pressure by the Left was directly responsible in the passage of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), an employment guarantee so significant 
that we cover this concept in its own subsection (Ramachandran, 2010). 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) 
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Passed in 2005 and implemented in a phased manner from 2006, the NREGA guarantees 100 
days of unskilled manual employment to members of rural households (Azam, 2012). Now 
renamed Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the 
scheme covers all rural districts of the country. The execution of the scheme is an explicit 
acknowledgement of the fact that India’s rapid growth and globalization has not created many 
benefits to its rural citizens and that employment is an entitlement which must be respected by 
the government. In the year 2010, nearly 53 million rural households were provided with around 
2862 million days of employment (Ghose, 2011). 
The program mandates the state governments to find suitable work for claimants within 15 days 
of an application being lodged, failure of which will result in the payment of a nominal minimum 
wage to beneficiaries. Typical projects include those generally considered the realm of such 
employment guarantee schemes, such as roadworks, irrigation, and construction. Besides a 
technique to ensure that rural residents are able to eke out a livelihood, this program is also a 
means to develop the rural economy as a whole and reduce the vast volume of migration to urban 
areas, causing the increase in informal and casual labor. The costs of the scheme are split 
between the state and central (federal) governments while states are given the authority to set 
wage rates (Azam, 2012). 
As the largest special employment program in the world, the NREGA has received much praise 
as an active solution to combat limited rural employment opportunities. However, the program 
has many flaws and limitations which need to be continually addressed. While the program 
offers up to 100 days of employment, an average rural household received only 54 days of 
employment, with wide variations by state. For example, the average beneficiary received only 
25 days of employment in the eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh while the average beneficiary 
received 95 days of employment in the state of Mizoram, also in the east. Those unable to secure 
a job are legally expected to be compensated, however, there is evidence that many of them do 
not actually receive any compensation. These problems call for an expansion in the scheme to 
ensure that the set targets can be met, and even increased as needed. In 2010, expenditure on the 
program amounted to 0.65% of the GDP, double that of just two years earlier; there is hope that 
further increases in size will allow the program to meet the needs of all eligible beneficiaries 
(Ghose, 2011). Another major problem with the program is that of leakages through corruption, 
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and addressing this problem requires a holistic discussion of corruption in India, which is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
5.3 Our Recommendations for India 
We now move on to creating policy recommendations for India to follow to maintain, and even 
increase, social spending in the face of globalization. These policies incorporate what we have 
learnt from generic policy recommendations outlined above while considering the unique context 
of India. 
The above section has allowed us to appreciate the size, scope, and importance of the NREGA 
scheme. NREGA is a key program to work towards rural development and provide livelihoods 
for the rural poor; this is important to mitigate the problem of surplus labor and 
underemployment which feeds into informal labor and undermines the bargaining power of the 
labor force as a whole. Given the significant input of the various state governments, alongside 
the central government, in the operation of the NREGA scheme, there is unsurprisingly much 
variation in the performance and effectiveness metrics of NREGA among states. There is a 
strong need to actively collect data on the operation of the program in the different states because 
as of now, India lacks a strong information technology infrastructure to analyze predictors of 
performance. Once such infrastructure is in place, India can take steps to understand why the 
scheme has been more effective in some states than others (Rengasamy & Sasi Kumar, 2011). 
Empirical studies in this sphere are relatively scarce and few look at the performance of every, or 
even several, states. However, a study into the higher-than-average performance levels in certain 
states in North-East India show us that regions with low levels of industry tend to have a higher 
positive response rate to NREGA; the highest returns accrue to regions with the lowest level of 
initial opportunity. This finding can be exploited on a district level too; individual districts in 
every state which have low levels of initial development and industry opportunity should be 
targeted for further penetration of NREGA, and any increases in the NREGA budget should be 
first directed to these districts. This would lead to an appreciable level of effectiveness seen in 
the targeted areas and make the case for further increases in the resources devoted to the 
program. This would also tend to create equity as the most disadvantaged districts would gain 
further attention and resources from the scheme. Besides through NREGA, these districts should 
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be targeted for the generation of further mainline public employment and broader rural 
development (Krishnamurty, 2008). 
A study analyzing the impact of NREGA between two states: Uttar Pradesh in the north Hindi-
speaking heartland, and Andhra Pradesh, in the south, identified political commitment and 
accountability of elected officials to the public as key indicators of the effectiveness of NREGA. 
This of course applies to other welfare programs undertaken too. Despite having a robust 
democratic framework, Indian officials at all levels of government are often not accountable to 
the public, especially the rural poor, due to high levels of illiteracy, the political dynamics, and 
the low levels of awareness among people. This is particularly true of relatively poor states such 
as Uttar Pradesh and others in the Hindi-speaking heartland and this explains that NREGA has 
been less effective there than in states like Andhra Pradesh, where the government has 
demonstrated interest for the program and has worked to make public officials more accountable 
to the citizenry. While the complex political processes which determine levels of corruption and 
accountability are beyond the scope of this analysis, the establishment of a strong information 
technology infrastructure which creates transparency through the storage, analysis, and 
distribution of information will tend to push towards greater accountability. Targeting 
participation of the most marginalized groups, such as women, has also been suggested to 
improve the effectiveness of the program (Dutta, 2015). 
When it comes to unionization and labor representation, the key problem is the rigid 
segmentation of workers as formal or informal. While the small minority of workers who are 
considered formal benefit from labor regulations which are considered among the most 
protective in the developing world, the vast majority of workers who are considered informal do 
not enjoy any benefits. Key to work towards creating more favorable circumstances for the entire 
workforce is to bridge this stark gulf. This involves not only fighting for the rights of informal 
workers but also reducing union militancy in the formal sector. The incentives which guide 
businesses to circumvent hiring formal workers must be studied. It is likely that businesses find 
that hiring protected workers is too expensive in terms of compliance costs. In such cases, it may 
be worth considering for the government to work with unions and agree to protective regulation 
being based on productivity to make hiring formal workers worthwhile for businesses. 
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There is a systematic divide between formal and informal workers in terms of skills, awareness, 
and even literacy levels. These workers can be specifically targeted to receive labor market 
programs such as training so they can gain the appropriate skills to make themselves more 
valuable to employers as formal workers. Informal workers should also be informed of their 
rights and expectations from their employers. Redressal mechanisms specifically to address 
grievances and labor rights violations involving informal workers can be set up so informal 
workers feel more empowered and so state entities and employers are more accountable to them. 
Moreover, the examples of Indonesia and Malaysia highlight the possibility of entire social 
security agencies and programs specifically designed for informal workers. 
Civil society has a huge opportunity to play a leading role here. They can provide a voice to 
marginalized groups who may be adversely affected by changes to social spending as well as to 
informal workers. They can band together and produce a unified voice to work towards 
accountability of public officials towards citizens and empowerment of citizens by greater 
transparency and improved access to redressal mechanisms. Civil society organizations can 
organize social audits of major programs to ensure that the money is going where it is destined 
and not ending as leakages captured within the bureaucracy (Dutta, 2015). Informal workers are 
difficult to organize, however, this is a challenge which can be taken up by civil society 
organizations. Empowering informal workers will also involve the provision of digital training 
so they can access information disbursed by the government and other organizations on social 
programs and their rights. E-government and social media are powerful tools to foster openness 
and transparency and when able to use such tools, marginalized groups can be actively involved 
in political and social processes (Bertot, Jaeger & Grimes, 2010). 
The skills gap is an important determinant of whether a worker ends up as a formal or informal 
employee and it is vital that unskilled workers receive the opportunity to upgrade their skills and 
develop skills in demand. This is another task which can be taken up by non-government 
organizations. Moreover, the provision of skills and training can also be included in schemes 
such as NREGA or separate schemes, with a possible link to NREGA. Such programs must also 
take into consideration the local context in order to meet people’s needs and be effective. In 
India, given the levels of poverty, many cannot afford the lost income associated with pursuing 
formal education. Therefore, the informal passing on of skills within the family through 
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apprenticeships is a very popular means of learning and training. These efforts can further be 
supported through community-led efforts involving non-government organizations. Meanwhile, 
governments can also support such efforts by subsidizing such training and complementing it 
with vocational training to improve and diversify the skills of a household (Unni & Rani, 2003). 
Therefore, this paper provides recommendations for India along the following lines: 
acknowledging the importance of employment generation programs like NREGA and identifying 
ways to improve effectiveness by developing stronger IT infrastructure to perform data analysis 
and compare performance across states and regions; reducing the segmentation between informal 
and formal workers and reduce incentives to hire informal workers; and target training and 
education opportunities to informal workers in order to make them more appealing as formal, 
full-time employees to firms. 
6. Conclusion 
This research was undertaken for the purpose of determining if globalization was associated with 
a decline in social spending in developing countries and what lessons could India learn from the 
experience of other nations to protect its social spending as it continues to integrate itself in the 
global economy. 
This study began with a definition of social spending to be used throughout to maintain 
consistency. Drawing upon the work of other scholars, social spending was broadly defined as all 
types of government spending intended to protect citizens from poverty and deprivation. The use 
of the term ‘social spending’ was justified as a result of the hazy boundaries of the associative 
concepts of social security and social welfare. The importance of social spending, particularly in 
an economy experiencing globalization, was emphasized upon on the basis that such an economy 
experiences significant change which many vulnerable groups may not be able to exploit to their 
economic advantage. This discussion was complemented by emphasizing the increase in 
globalization, especially among developing countries, which has taken place in the past few 
decades, often through international pressure. 
The study went further to explain the need for social spending in developing countries, a concept 
typically applied only to developed countries. At the same time, examples of how particular 
countries are implementing particular social programs highlighted the lacking infrastructure and 
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resources to run efficient programs. These problems are particularly acute in developing 
countries embracing the global economy. The study then went on to identify the effects of 
globalization on social spending among developing and developed countries. Making use of 
empirical evidence from predominantly developed countries over time and the theoretical 
frameworks of the Strong Globalization and Diminished Democracy hypotheses, we understood 
that the effects of globalization on welfare spending may be divergent among developing and 
developed countries. 
Next, the study strived to clarify the particular characteristics of developing and developed 
countries which are responsible for this divergence. Understanding the experience of individual 
countries, and regions as they became increasingly globalized pointed to some key determinants 
of the impact of globalization on welfare spending. These include the level of democracy and the 
quality of institutions; the extent of surplus and informal labor; the demographic distribution of 
the population; the intensity of civil society; and the collective bargaining and unionization rights 
afforded to employees. General recommendations for developing countries were then developed 
in order to maintain social spending in a globalizing context. 
The study then applied these findings to the case of India. This began with first understanding 
the unique economic and social context and circumstances of India by delving into the situation 
with democracy, surplus labor, the informal sector, and employment guarantee programs in 
place. Tying together the general recommendations developed along with the Indian context 
allows us to create specific recommendations for India. These include improving the integrity of 
employment guarantee programs; working towards reducing the hierarchical segmentation 
between informal and formal workers by increasing protection for informal workers and diluting 
the overprotective standards for formal workers; as well as targeting informal workers for 
training and education opportunities. 
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